

*Secretary Muskie*

# Essentials of Security: Arms and More

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NEW LONDON, CT 06320*Following is an address by Secretary Muskie before the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh on September 18, 1980.*

In recent months the atmosphere has been unusually thick with pronouncements about an American military decline. We cannot let such funereal forecasts go unanswered. They are wrong on the facts, and they can be dangerous in their effect.

I am here today to take sharp issue with the evangelists of American weakness—to affirm that America today is strong and growing stronger. If our nation truly were neglecting its defenses, it would be the duty of all informed people to sound the alarm. But false declarations of weakness only intensify the dangers we face. They can cause our friends to doubt us and our enemies to discount us. They can distract us from other work necessary to make our society stronger and our world more secure.

## The Defense Record

So let us evaluate the defense record, but let us evaluate it fairly. Let us weigh the East-West balance realistically. And let us give due regard to our own strength as well as that of our opposition.

Our allies are stronger, our alliances sturdier than those of the Soviet Union. In economic power, the United States and our NATO allies outstrip the Warsaw Pact more than two to one. Taken together, we devote more to defense than the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. Our alliances have the added dependability that is derived when values and purposes are truly shared. Unlike the

Warsaw Pact, NATO members and Japan are allies by choice. The purpose of our alliances is not to camouflage the ambitions of one member, but to defend the freedom of all.

At least one-fourth of the Soviet Union's ground combat forces are tied down on the long common border with China. The nations on our borders are friends.

Technology is another American advantage. "Faster," "more accurate," "more advanced,"—these generally are terms that apply to American weapons and American systems. Soviet technology has lagged behind.

And our security is also advanced by the content of our foreign policy—by the international principles we support. On a global basis, we stand for essential precepts of national sovereignty and human rights. Certainly we live in a tumultuous world, characterized by the unremitting nationalism and surging human aspirations of more than 100 new nations. But if such an environment is unsettling to us, it will prove to be even more perilous for nations seeking to dominate others and dictate their systems. Such imperial concepts are the wave of the past. They collide head-on with the historic trends now underway virtually everywhere in the world—from the patriots in Afghanistan to the nationalists in every nation of the Third World, from the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to the gallant workers of Poland who have inspired us all.

In sum, our technology, our solid security partnerships, our identification with national independence and human freedom—all of these assets should strengthen our confidence as we assess the sufficiency of our defenses.

They do not, however, give us cause for complacency. Our military posture continues to require our diligent attention. In the Soviet Union, we face a rival that has engaged for more than a generation in a steady buildup of its military forces, both conventional and strategic. In strategic nuclear forces the Soviets have attained a rough equivalence. In the conventional area they have increased the danger to our Asian and European allies. They have aimed for the status of global power—the capacity for direct involvement even in distant regions. And now in Afghanistan they have shown no hesitancy in applying their power in a brutal attempt to crush a sovereign neighbor.

The question facing Americans is not whether we should respond to these developments. All agree that we must. The real question is whether we will continue with a well-conceived and measured response tailored to the actual threats we face, or whether we will run off wildly in all directions at once, spending vastly greater sums to little, if any, effect.

Let me briefly survey what the response thus far has been. In overall terms our arms spending is no longer dropping. It is growing. Our defense spending declined in 7 of the 8 years just before President Carter took office—a total drop of more than 37%.

Since President Carter's inauguration, however, defense spending has increased 4 years in a row—for overall growth of 10% after inflation. And if the President's 5-year plan is carried out, the increase by 1985 will exceed 27%.

To make it absolutely clear that we are not proposing to squeeze our Armed Forces, let me just note here that this 5-year defense program calls for appropriations of over \$1 trillion between now and 1985.

Even so, there are those who pronounce that effort insufficient. They insist upon a still larger arms budget. They will not tell us what it would contain. They leave those decisions for later. They simply want "more"—of whatever, as if shoveling out the taxpayer's money is a desirable end in itself. That is a formula not for greater security but for guaranteed waste—a failing to avoid in defense just as much as in any other part of the budget.

Instead we need a carefully structured defense program that responds effectively to specific dangers. And that is what we have. In conventional forces, the Carter Administration began promptly in 1977 to address the military deficiencies of NATO—matters which previously had received abundant discussion and precious little concrete attention.

Today the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, an American initiative, is in its third year. Problems ranging from readiness and prompt reinforcement to integrating air defenses are no longer simply being studied; they are being solved. These NATO improvements are underwritten by an alliance agreement to increase defense spending by at least 3% each year—another initiative of the United States.

We are engaged in a broad modernization of the Army's weapons and equipment. We have begun the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the Vietnam war. And our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships over the next 5 years, building toward a newer and more capable fleet of 550 ships, in contrast to 476 in 1977.

With these programs moving forward, we have also begun bolstering our ability to respond to emergencies outside the major alliance regions—including the vital Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Our naval presence there today is the strongest ever. We have negotiated new agreements for access to ports and airfields. We are prepositioning equipment and supplies in the Indian Ocean area. A new cargo aircraft is being developed. The elements of a rapid deployment force have been designated and exercises are underway.

Our programs in the area of nuclear weapons reflect this same commitment to the deterrence of war through the assurance of strength. Last year, NATO adopted our recommendations for modernizing theater nuclear forces in Europe. On intercontinental or strategic nuclear forces, the hard decisions have been made. A sweeping modernization of all three parts of our nuclear triad—land, sea, and air—is moving ahead.

- For the strategic bomber forces, President Carter took the soundest course, even though it meant also taking some political heat. Instead of sinking billions of dollars in a B-1 bomber with a doubtful future, he decided to equip our existing bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. In place of an old concept highly vulnerable to Soviet countermoves, he selected an array of advanced technologies that can surmount foreseeable Soviet defenses.

- At sea, the Trident submarine program was put back on track. The first of those modern submarines will join the fleet next year. Portions of the existing fleet already have the Trident I missile, with major improvements in range and power.

- And on the land, the new MX missile, with mobile basing, will overcome the chief source of potential nuclear instability—the growing vulnerability of missiles fixed in silos. As with our bomber forces, President Carter rejected second-best suggestions and made sure we had the best plan before construction began, so we would not have to waste time and money later fixing the mistakes.

## SALT II

Along with these programs—cruise missiles, Trident, the MX—there is a fourth program I want to mention—a "secret weapon," if you will. Let me list some of its capabilities. By itself, this secret weapon would knock out about one-fourth of all long-range Soviet missiles and bombers that we project for 1985. It would do that without launching a nuclear war; indeed, without even firing a shot. In the process, it would eliminate thousands of individual warheads and bombs that the Soviet arsenal could otherwise have aimed at our country. The secret weapon has surveillance capabilities. With it, we will be able to keep better track of Soviet forces and programs.

For all of its military effectiveness, there is no incompatibility whatsoever between this secret weapon and our other strategic programs. MX, Trident, and air-launched cruise missiles can all go ahead as planned. Adding this weapon will not require massive new appropriations. In fact, in the long run, money will be saved. Nor does it worry our allies. On the contrary, they know about it and they strongly support it. Their only concern is that we might not adopt it.

Of course the weapon I am referring to is not a weapon at all. It is an agreement—the SALT II Treaty. But it nonetheless will make all the contributions to our security I have just described. There is nothing soft or innocent about it. It is an integral part of a hard-headed strategy of American defense. And it should be recognized as such. Indeed, it may well be that some of those who oppose SALT II would support it—even insist on it—if it were a defense expenditure that could buy the same results.

The contribution of SALT to our defense underscores the second of two messages I want to leave here today. The first, as I have suggested, is that our defenses—alone and in combination with our allies—are second to none. We are determined to see that they remain so. That determination is not just stated in words; it is backed up in the budget. The second message is that simply spending

more money and building more arms—even accumulating vast military power—will not be enough to assure our security in today's world.

### Enhancing U.S. Security

Even our defense posture itself depends upon other international assets and skills. Recall NATO's Long-Term Defense Program, its agreement on greater defense efforts, the decision on theater nuclear forces, our access to facilities in the Indian Ocean. Actions such as these cannot be manufactured out of either unilateral announcements or unspecified new spending. They are the products of careful negotiation and steady leadership—endeavors every bit as vital to our defense as arms.

And those endeavors have other applications indispensable to our security. True security in a nuclear age demands steps that lessen the risk that war will happen. That is the mandate of arms control—in combination with a strong defense, to help achieve a stable balance, and to avoid miscalculation by either side. For we know that nuclear war would mean catastrophe for every side. In such times it would only jeopardize our security to reject arms control and embrace doctrines—including the chimera of nuclear superiority—that invite a nuclear arms race.

Our security is also advanced by a vigorous diplomacy—fashioning a mature, stable basis of cooperation even with countries, such as China, that have different systems from ours. We must not retreat from those efforts, confuse them, or be confused by them.

Our security has been enhanced by the success of peacemaking in Zimbabwe. That effort deprived our adversaries of a conflict to exploit. Some Americans wanted to disrupt the peace process by prematurely ending our participation in international sanctions. We can all be grateful they did not prevail.

Our security is still more deeply involved in the Middle East, where the Camp David process has produced the first real peace agreement since Israel came into being. Only patient, persistent, and imaginative diplomacy can reconcile the remaining issues—the same kind of diplomacy that hammered out the accords at Camp David. Bellicose pronouncements or assaults on the negotiating process that offer no concrete alternatives neither advance that enterprise nor serve the cause of peace.

And our security is affected by a broad range of economic issues that arms cannot touch. We could never have blasted a new trade agreement into being. We cannot threaten stagnating economies to make them prosper or intimidate hungry people into health.

Yet our fate ultimately turns on such questions, even as it rests on the balance of power. If we neglect such challenges, our fate may be to slide into oblivion, rather than being blown there. But we will get there all the same.

In short, our security in the future requires the same priorities that have marked our foreign policy in the recent past. On defense, we must continue the steady, prudent improvement of our Armed Forces. We must specifically repudiate the false message that ours is a frail nation. And our security requires something more. It requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the world we share, a commitment to peace as well as power, a capacity to work constructively with others to advance common purposes and meet the full range of challenges ahead.

I am convinced that the American people understand the need for such a balanced American approach to the world. I believe they support a defense posture of strength and confidence and a foreign policy of construction and hope. ■

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